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KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH AND THE AFTERMATH 
Donnalee Rowe 
History Honors Thesis 
February 5, 1964 
Three years after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev presented 
before the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, a secret 
speech, condemning Stalin and the development of the cult of the 
individual around him. In so doing, he promised to return to the 
Marxist-Leninist principles and to collective leadership. I shall try, 
in this paper, to summarize the various changes that have occurred 
within the years succeeding the speech. I shall try to show that 
there has been no basic change in the Soviet system of government, 
but that some controls have been relaxed and the method of control has 
been changed to reflect Khrushchev's personality. 
March 5, 1953, marks a turning point in the history of Thlssia. 
On this date Stalin died, ending a quarter-century of rule by a 
dictator, and beginning the rule of the collective in an easier 
atmosphere •1 The official announcement of his death revealed the 
seriousness of the event. 
Our task is to guard ••• the steel-like and monolithic 
unity of the pa.rty as the apple of our eye ••• rand to 
maintain] high political vigilance, irreconcilability 
and stalwartness in the struggle against inner and outer 
foes •••• The most important task of the party and the 
government is to insure uninterrupted and correct 
leadership, ••• the greatest unity of leadership and 2 
the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic •••• 
In this time of crisis, words of assurance would seem more appropriate 
but instead the alarmwas sounded. 
An examination of the system which had been ruled by Stalin will 
reveal the cause for concern. Through numerous purges, Stalin had 
set up a pennanent dictatorship based on fear. The fear stemmed from 
the suspicious nature of the dictator. Stalin was a strict discipli-
narian and ruled with an iron hand. He tried to regulate all phases 
of Soviet life. He regarded an/deviation, or appearance of deviation, 
as a threat to his personal authority and had it quickly repressed. 
The instrument of regulation was the organization of secret police. 
There were no legal guarantees to the citizen and the police could 
make arbitrary arrests, accusations, and carry out executions. 
Torture was permitted so in most cases there was a "confession" to 
support the execution; mock trials were possible also. 
1 
2 
It was a dictatorship which waged war on its own people but it 
seemed to thrive on hatred and suspicion.3 Under Stalin's direction, 
Russia had made tremendous advances in the fields of science and 
industry. He had carried the Soviet Union from an industrially. 
backward nation to a contender for world power. The important men 
under Stalin achieved their high position because he placed them 
there--a result of their ability to praise him and follow along his 
policies without arousing his suspicion, rather that their capabilities 
as leaders. The men who had demonstrated the qualities of leadership 
and independent thought had been purged in the early years after the 
revolution, and mediocre men, whom Stalin could manipulate replaced 
them. 
With the death of Stalin, a sensitive situation developed because, 
in a·: permanent dictatorship, there is no legi time.ta successor, yet 
government apparatus calls for another dictator. 4 On March 5, the 
collective began the task of attempting to rule as a gro_µp over a 
system built for absolute dictatorship. The position of dictator 
remained open and the collective struggled for individual power. 
The period from 1953 to 1956 marks the steady ascendency of 
Khrushchev to power. On March 6, 1953, Malenkov was the most prominent 
member of the collective. He had been close to Stalin throughout his 
rule and seemed to be his logical successor. Also, like Stalin, he 
was the First Secretary of the Party and the Prime Minister in the 
government. Beria was the other apparent contender for power within 
the collective. The head of the Secret Police, he had a great 
potential to establish his rule by force and continue along the 
3 
same line as Stalin. Khrushchev was the least of the collective. 
In one of its first acts,, the members of the collective combined 
to destroy Beria. He was arrested quickly and executed ·in December, 
1953 in a manner reminicent of Stalin. Malenkov was forced to resign 
his position as Party Secretary in the early weeks of the collective 
and Khrushchev replaced him in September. Because of Malenkov's 
prestige, he retained his influence in policy matters until February, 
1955 when he was forced out of the government completely. Bulganin, 
Khrushchev's foil, replaced him. The collective had worked to maintain 
a balance of power within it, and, in so doing, Khrushchev had been able 
inc9nspicuoµs1y_:l;u increase his power until by 1956 there seemed to be 
• 5 
no one who could seriously challenge his power. 
The policies of this period are confusing. They vacillated 
between a more liberal rule and the traditional Stalinist lirre--an 
indication of the power struggle going on behind the scenes. There 
was one consistent feature throughout this entire period •. Khrushchev,, 
as head of the Party apparatus, continued to s'1bstitute his proteg~s 
in government and Party positions. 6 Stalin's spirit.was strong, even 
in death. 7 His personality had given Russia its· characteristics and, 
however the people felt about him, whether love or hatred, it was an 
intense feeling and always mixed with fear. 8 The rule_ of the collective· 
called for a drastic change in the government machirier_;1, and, in putting 
·~f.t:S~· policies into effect, they had to cope with this emotional state 
of the people. Immediately after Stalin's death, an, atmosphere of 
greater freedom was introduced probably because of the insecurity of 
the collective. Amnesty for military and criminal prisoners was 
granted. Malenkov announced increased food and consume rs I goods. 
The Doctors P~ot, created by Stalin to initiate another purge, was 
' :;.·9: 
repudiated as false. / ·The censorship was reduced and the resulting 
thaw in literature was important particularly in awaking the intelligentsia. 
Arrun Khachaturian, writing a critical review in 1953, stated: 
••• The musical authorities must desis't from the harmful 
practice of interi'ering in the artistic activities of the 
composer. Creative Pf8blems cannot be solved by 
bureaucratic methods·. 
At approximately the srune time W. Pomerantsev wrote in the Novy Mir: 
''Honesty is what in my opinion is 1 acking in some of our books and 
plays •••• Insincerity is not necessarily the same as lying, for 
t . lt d ' . '1 . . 1111 s i e ness is a so insincere. 
In late 1954, a reversal of this liberal trend was seenoand 
Khrushchev used the Se.cond Soviet Vlriters Congress to remind the 
' 12 
writers in no uncertain terms of their obligation to the Party. 
Another. Stalinist policy vvhich Khrushchev retrieved in Jenuary, 1955 
stressed the priority of heavy industry in direct contradiction to 
Malenkov, foreshadoi.ring his 'eclipse in February of the same yea.r. 13 
In these early weeks of 1955 Khrushchev seemed to seek authority through 
his close associatio,n with Stalin, believing that the Stalin image 
might confer legitimacy. A biographical article written in this period 
called Khrushchev' 1'one of the closest comrade-in-arms of J. V. Stalin. "14 
And, as late as December ?l, 1955, Pravda honored Stalin's birthday 
which had passed igriored in 1954.15 
5 
The inconsistency in policy could not last, nor could a trend 
away from Stalinism conti nuo in silence: The decention of Stal in' s 
infallibility caused consternation among the people over policy changes 
by the collective. Stalin's image had been built too high and the 
collective was now dwarfed by it. The relaxation of controls necessary 
to stop the stagnation of fussia, both culturally and economically, 
involved many elements: the struggle for power at the top and the 
Party intrigues, pressure from the masses for better living conditions 
and the craving among the educated for more freedom. 16 This then was 
the situation which the collective faced· at the opening of the 
Twentieth Party Congress of February 14, 1956. Its answer was the 
secret speech delivered by Khrushchev the last night of Congress; t~ 
showed that none had the power to fill the dictator's shoes; and, 
required that the collective be maintained, at least in name, to share 
equally in the responsibility. The· leaders had survived the first 
crisis of Stalin's death. Now came the crucial test. 
6 
The Twentieth .Party Congress was opened by Khrushchev at 10:00 a.m. 
February 14,, J956. Attending were 1, 355 delegates with voting status, 
.;P 
and 81 delegates with consultative status. Delegates from 55 foreign 
17 
Communist parties also were represented. Within eleven days, 
eighty-five speeches were delivered, most of which dealt with the $tate 
U . 18 of the· Soviet nion. · Of importance is the fact that in these speeches 
.were announced no basic changes from past policies. On the contrary,, 
·the policies were reaffinned. In his ·Report of the Central Committee,, 
Khrushchev stated: 
• • • The Com.~unist Party of the Soviet Union has always 
manifested and continues to manifest concern for the 
preponderant development of heavy industry which is the 
foundation for the growth of all branches of the 
socialist economy,, for raising our country's defense · 
potential and for improving the people's well-being. 19 
Agricultural policies extended the Stalinist line even further with 
the reduction.of ~he number of collective farms by increasing their size. 20 
In the. same speech Khrushchev called for a restoration of Party 
norms, condemned the ,"turning on one or· another leader into a miracle-
working hero, at the same time belittling the role of the Party and the 
masses and tending to reduce their creative effort. 1• 21 He was 
followed in later speeches by Mikoyan and Malenkov,, both condemning the 
cult which ,"at a certain period. inflicted great harm on the cause of 
the leadership of ·the Party and the country. n 22 
A fevr d·ays la.ter on February 25, 1956, a surprise closed session of 
. . ·23 
Congress was called. . Only the 1,,355 delegates with vote attended. 
These were 'allowed to take no notes, only to listen and to berKhrushchev' s 
sounding bo.ard. 24 . In this atmosphere Khrushchev delivered the speech 
7 
denouncing the cult of Stalin. This speech was not published in the 
Sovie~ Union nor anywhere until the United States State Department 
25 
·published it on June 4, 1956 •. 
Al though Khrushchev declared that the purpose of his speech was 
to show how the cult grew, he devoted more time to a criticism of 
Stalin. 26 He based his criticism on three facts: (1) Stalin's 
personality defects, (2) Stalin's purges of Communists, and (3) Stalin's 
faulty war leadership. 
To point out the defects, he compared the personalities of Stal in 
and Lenin. Lenin only "tried to persuade; he patiently explained his 
opinions to others. Lenin always diligently saw to it that the norms of 
Party life were realized, that the Party statutes were enforced, that 
the Party Congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions took place 
at the proper intervals."27 This is contrasted to Stalin who had 
displayed none of these qualities. Khrushchev further stated that 
Lenin had recognized these deficiencies as evidenced by Lenin's 
"testament" which he read in part: 28 
Stiilin is too rude, and this failing, which is quite 
tolerable in our midst- and in relations among us Communists, 
becomes intolerable in the office of Secretary-General. 
Therefore, I propose to the Comrades that they think of a . 
way of removing Stalin from this post and appointing it to 
another person who in all other re?:pects differs from · · 
Comrade Stalin in one advantage a.lone, namely., that he be 
more tolerant, more loyal, more courteous and 2~re 
considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc. 
With reference to his criticism of Stalin's purges of Communists 
he stated: 
It was precisely during this period (1935-37-1938) that 
the practice of mass repression through the state apparatus 
was born, first against the enemies of Leninism ••• --and 
8 
subsequently also against many honest Communists •••• 
Stalin originated the concept ''enemy of the people'' •••• 
This term made possible the use of the most cruel repression, 
viola.ting all norms of revolutionary legality •••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
f.stalin made] an attempt at theoretical justification of the 
mass terror policy under the pretext that class war mus~0 
allegedly sharpen as we march forward toward socialism. 
Khrushchev proved his point by citing numerous cases in which good, 
honest Communists were falsely accused yet died still loyal to the 
Party, nand Stalin doubtless knew of them."31 
Khrushchev claimed that Stalin as a war leader was completely 
incapable. He was unprepared for the German attack a. lthough he had 
received ample warning. "Even after the war began, the nervousness 
and hysteria. which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual 
military operations, ca.used our anny serious da.mage. 1132 Khrushchev 
asserted that he knew what was needed to further the war effort but 
was hindered by Stalin's stupidity. He further claimed that he had 
gone so far as to stand up for Zhukov when Stalin criticized his 
military ability.33 Stalin used the war to build up his own image: 
• • • In various ways he tried to implant among the 
people the fiction that all victories gained by the 
Soviet people during the great patriotic war were due to 
the courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one 
else •••• We must state that after the war the situation 
became even more complicated. Stalin became even more 
capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular, his 
suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable 
dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his 
very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the 
collective even more. He decided everything a.lone, without 
any consideration for anyone or a.nything. 34 
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Finally Khrushchev arrived at the most relevant point: "How 
could it .be [according to the tenents of Marxism-Leninisri!) ?'' He did 
not answer the rhetorical question but merely stated: 
In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner 
only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized 
by the cult of the individual leader, only by those who do 
not understand the essence of the revolution and of the 
Soviet state •••• 35 
He then asked: ~!![here were the members of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee?"36 According to Khrushchev, in the context of time 
and place in which they made their decisions, they failed to recognize 
Stalin's deficiencies because initially he had been a capable Marxist 
leader. By the time his abuses were seen it was too late. "Attempts 
to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent 
. 37 
falling victim of the repressions." No plenary sessions were 
convened so there was no chance of unity to take a stand against 
Stalin. But "we cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot" 
for Stalin was convinced that all this was necessary for the defense 
of the working people.38 "In this lies the whole tragedy. 11 39 
Khrushchev's guarantee to Congress is this: "In order not to repeat 
errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely 
against the cult of.the individual leader. 1140 He.closed with • • • 
the explanation for the need of secrecy: 
We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition 
to the enemy, we should not wash our dirty linen before 
their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress 
will understand and assess all these proposals properly4 ... Long live the victorious banner of our party--Leninism! 1 
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At first glance the speech appears to be a candid revelation, 
indicating the best of intentions. Yet on closer examination the 
speech is a most revealing indictment of the entire Soviet system 
including the present leaders. Khrushchev raised the question "How 
could it be?" and, by not answering it, revealed the need for an 
investigation of the entire system. He did not even attempt to answer 
it but turned on the questioner with the accusation of being ''blinded 
and hopelessly hypnotized.'• Instead of analyzing political, social and 
economic roots, Khrushchev used an un-Marxist explanation in stressing 
the deficiencies in Stalin's character.42 This ideal of a personality 
being so important is foreign to Marx who stated that it was the time 
and place that determined the character of the individuai.43 According 
to Marx's theory, then, one could question·the desirability for such 
a system calling for a Stalin. Khrushchev's answer is that there was a 
deviation from the Marxist principles which developed.:iinto the cult of 
the individual. Now all of the evil of the society could be attributed 
to Stalin's exceptional defects. The question of how the Soviet society 
t 
. . . 4 
could depart from its path o such a .point of degeneration was bypassed.~ 
Where were the members of the Politburo? A review of their 
activities preceding the death of Stalin would reveal that they were 
busy building up the cult of Stalin. On Stalin's 70th birthday, 
December 21, 1949, Khrushchev closed a speech with: nGlory to our 
dear father, wise teacher, the genius leading the rarty, the Soviet 
people and the working people of the whole world, Comrade Stalin!"45 
This statement was made after the war which Khrushchev claimed that 
11 
Sta.lin ha.d so badly managed. The circumstances were such, according 
to Khrushchev, tha.t the collective could not do anything. But was 
such apparent whole-hearted praise necessary or was this deceiving the 
people to s a.ve his neck? However, from the speech one wonders why 
the collective could not do anything. 
Khrushchevwas right in his indignation at the mass killing and 
deportation of people. "Not only no Marxist-Leninist, but also no man 
of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations 
responsible for inimical activity •••• 't46 Yet where were the 
Politburo members when this occurred? The members knew tha.t they 
would fall in any attempt to expose these gi'ourl.dless suspicions. Also, 
because of Stalin's popularity, the people would not have believed them, 
and rallied to the support of Stalin. But who filled the numerous 
labor camps and prisons? Surely, these and Khrushchev's men "of common 
sense'' would have come to the support of the collective. 
Khrushchev claimed that Stalin, incapacitated during the early 
stage of the war had let some power slip from his ha.nds. Why did the 
Politburo members, recognizing by this time his deficiencies, return 
this power? Khrushchev's claim of ignorance as a plea for innocence is 
not valid. He contradicts himself by showing his awareness of Stalin's 
faults during the war. Even if the claim were valid it serves as an 
accusation in itself, for they could not seriously call themselves 
lea.de rs when such major events were going on without their knowledge. 
Thus, Khrushchev opened up a case for the indictment of the collective. 
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He recognized this and warned the Congress: 'twe should not wash our 
dirty linen before their eyes." De-Sta.linizing as quietly as possible 
was their only course, for they, as heirs· to Stal in, 'and owing their 
positions to him, were deeply compromised too.47 
In this speech, Khrushchev was concerned only with the crimes 
against the party members. This removed the responsibility of larger 
crimes from the Party and enabled tilt::: to implicate Stalin individually. 48 
The failure to include other crimes in his speech becomes more 
significant when he attributed them by implication to the positive role 
of Stalin. Among the greatest of these were the mass repressions of the 
Kulaks, the true "enemies of Leninism, 11 the partition of Poland, and 
the purges of nclass" enemies. The crimes that a.re mentioned are of 
such magnitude that they warrant a stronger· indictment than "the tragedy" 
of Stalin. Stalin ha.d fashioned the Soviet Regime, in the name of the 
working class, under the theory of developing a. Communistic state. The 
state (the Communist experiment) and the dicta.tor were insepara~le. 
By calling Stalin to a·ccount, Khrushchev is placing the entire experiment 
in a precarious position. Yet he chooses to label this development a 
personal tragedy. This is an important contradiction of the speech for 
it indicates that Khrushchev does not consider the system at fa.ult--
only its founder. 
The speech is filled with small discrepancies and distortions, a . 
strategy similar to that used by Stalin. Khrushchev was not consistent 
in his condemnation of Stalin as deviating from Leninism. Lenin's 
"testament" was a.n appeal for collectivity as well es a characterization 
of Stalin. Lenin desired to increase the membership of the Central 
13 
Committee :bi order to a.void a split between Stalin and Trotsky. 
Trotsky, he felt, had outstanding abilities and was the most able 
among the ;members. But Khrushchev approved of the removal of TrotsbJ and 
his followers, a move definitely against Lenin's wish. Khrushchev 
credited Stalin with having invented the tenn "enemy of the people," but 
it had been used by Lenin in 1917 when he prepared the law outlawing 
the Kadet Party, :"the party of ,the enemies of the people. 1149 He 
accused Stalin of incorrectly interpreting Lenin in urging class war. 
Though class war was necessary at the beginning, Stal in· used the term 
as a justification for extenninating Communist political opposition 
after class war should have ceased. After the war was ilio longer~needed 
in ,rn34, hmvevei-, Khrushchev, himself, had called for "the final annilation 
50 
of the class ,enemies •••• 
Khrushchev's guarantee against the rise of another dictator is 
questionable. ·He seemed to be trying to prove that the existence of 
the collective leadership was adequate insurance. With no practical 
limits pl~ced on the acquisition of power, however, and Khrushchev's 
apparent ascendency, no reasonably intelligent person could take this 
guarantee seriously. Instead, the speech µ-oved the need for a representative 
government~ba?ed on fundamental political liberties, and a need for a 
check on the authority of the le a.de rs. Khrushchev, in his presentation 
of the speech, had substituted the cult of Lenin for the cult of Stalin 
which he could interpret as needed. 
14 
Although the speech opened up many questions, Khrushchev had 
sufficient control over the· situation for the presen.t. 
From the point of view of immediate ·politic al :{eali ty 
there was, for every sentence that Khrushchev,':.had spoken. 
an emergency exit; for fYery floodga.te he had' opened,. 
there was a nearby drun~ in every promise he had made, there 
was an implied th ree.t. 1 
Effective control could not be practiced in a democracy, but Khrushchev 
still had the same basic weapons as Stalin.· . Coupled with this he had 
an acute political sense as to how far he could go in she.king up the 
Soviet people. 52 
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With Stalin's death, the collective 1fta:c'.'ecd~:':tremendous,· '· '" 
problems. It had taken .'over a bureaucracy not suited to control by 
a collective end was insecure in this position. It was faced with 
problems which celled for inunediate action. In some instances the 
action taken was contradictary to the Stalinist policy, viz., the 
healing of the breach between Ti to' s Yugoslavia e.nd Russia. The 
collective had a di:lemna: its authority derived from Stalin necessitated 
the maintenance of his.infallibility, yet there had to be e. change. 
Alongside were the pressures that were building up from the people. 
The masses had been controlled by brute force and the use of fear for 
twenty-five years. After Stalin's death there was a sigh of relief and 
h f t . . t• 53 an atmosp ere o an icipa ion. Hope rose to a high pitch. The 
collective had immediately destroyed the power of the secret police in 
1953 in order to secure its position and, in so doing, had broken 
down the wall holding back the people. It was an irrevocable step. 
By discrediting Stalin's policies it could also charge him with the 
failures and then proceed in the name of progress. This is the major 
reason for the speech--the use of Stalin es a scapegoat. The oollective's, 
and particularly Khrushchev's, rise to power demanded that these crimes 
not be repeated. 54 To give this guarantee, the group had to become 
the chief anti-Stelinists. Whether or not they originated the movement 
is a moot question and is not" particularly relevant in the succeeding 
events. By his degradation, then, it was rid of the "millstone of 
Stalin's heritage," and could' carry out reforms reversing his policies. 55 
The collective now had the added power to define the limits of the 
anti-Stalin campaign and it.gave them a basic ideology that they could 
fashion to meet any situation. 
')6 
"' There were other-benefits to be gained from de-Stelinization. The 
army hed renewed status due .to the rehabilitation of so many officers. 56 
Foreign relations were eased with a new approach of "peaceful 
coexistence."57 A new history could be written, without Stalinist 
distortions, which would have more historical accuracy. With freer 
contact with the Western world, the people could be roused from their 
cultural lethargy. 58 
Khrushchev realized that the implications of the speech would 
reflect on him and the rest of the collective. He must have kno~m that 
this could cause a serious questioning of the Soviet system. Tuby did 
he take the risk? In actuality the risk does not seem es great as it 
could have been. The infallibility of the Party suffered a severe blow; 
the influence of ideology and Party leadership to direct the thoughts of 
the people dime'hished.59 But leadership had been impossible before with 
I 
"Stalin Is gho'st still hovering so closely overhead and still attracting 
f . · n60 huge quantities o emotional energy, ranging from love to hate •••• 
By ridding themselves of Stalin's ghost, they could hope to give some 
authority to their power. Tpis gave Khrusuchev more status because he 
was identified as the: leader, and was able to associate other names, 
.' ·' . 
particularlyMalenkov's, with Stalin and his abuses. Although there 
were risks involved, de-Stalinization seems to be the only choice. No 
one was strong enough to step into the dictatorship. Khrushchev did not 
. , ... 
provoke the crisis, but brought it out into the open. 61 Considering the 
seriousness of the ~mplications of the speech, the skillful manner in 
which it was worded caused a minimum of disturbance. 
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The speech was an affinnation of a policy which had been developing 
since March, 1953. · This policy of allowing more freedom had been 
sporadic--it had been put forth and then quickly withdrawn at the first 
sign of trouble. The sp~ech was an indication of a more definite 
policy, but its ambiguity leaves much to be desired as a policy 
statement. Of greater importance is the fact that the speech was actually 
stated and now the people could think about it regardless of the 
official interpretation. As a result of this pseudo-liberal policy, 
significant changes have occurred in every aspect of Soviet life and 
the speech itself has caused additional pressure to carry these changes 
further. 
The most dramatic effects of the speech came with the events in 
Poland and Hungary. In these· couiltries, Stalin had never been the 
father-figure, wonderful, yet terrible, and there was no numbing shock 
at the revelation of Khrushchev. 62 After the Twentieth Party Congress, 
there began to be open criticism of conditions led by the writers. 63 
+ 
••• There were among the elder generation of intellectuals 
(especially of economists i,ri Poland and of imaginative 
writers in Hungary) men who were Marxists, but had become 
disillusioned with the ri~e, and who had the experience 
and the ability to give~ead ~o the intellectual youth, 
which was also against the rlgime, but inexperienced and 
inarticulate. 64 
There was widespread discontent in both countries. The peasants 
particularly, resisted collectivization and exploitation.65 The 
workers were dangerous because of their concentration in cities. The 
speech occurred at a sensitive time: it occurred at the most difficult 
stage before the new institutions, introduced by the Soviets, had taken 
18 
root and the external pressure, combined with internal disorder, 
brought the situatio_n to the breaking point.66 Khrushchev, in healing 
the breach with Yugoslavia, had declared that there was more than one 
road to socialism, an opening grabbed by Hungary and Poland. 67 These 
two countries had a special condition lacking in other Communist countries: 
the discontent polarized around two leaders, Gomulka. in Poland and 
Nagy in Hungary. But with Hungary, Khrushchev made it clear that 
another "Yugoslavia." was not possible and Soviet troops marched in, 
seizing Hungary by force. The justification sounded like it ca.me 
directly from Stalin; the revolt was led by fa.cists who desired to 
exploit the people under the "guise of false slogans of 'freedom and 
independence.'" The Soviet Union thus entered for the protection of 
th k . 1 68 e wor ing peep e. The leader, Prime Minister Nagy, was executed. 
In Poland, events never reached the seriousness of Hungary. The 
security officers remained loyal to Gomulka., and Khrushchev, to avoid 
war recognized him as the head. 69 Under his influence the collective 
farms were dissolved, peasant 1 s taxes were lowered and an agreement 
. 70 
was made with the Catholic church which allowed fi':~':l more freedom. 
The speech and the succeeding events, particularly in Hungary, 
raised a cry from foreign Communist Parties. The first reaction after 
disbelief was a demand for further explanations. In all the editorials 
. 
. 
of the Communists~ papers, they pointed out that the "how" and "why'• was 
not answered. These foreign Communists were able to:re.ise the questions 
not admitted in Russia. The June 6, 1956 U.S. Daily Worker wrote: 
't'vVe do not consider the speech to be the last word on just how Stalin's 
terror control came into existence and maintained itself for twenty 
19 
years and of the role of the other Communist leaders.tt71 Toglia.tti 
of the Italian Communist party pointed out the same deficiency: 
. 72 
nThe true problems a.re evaded, which a.re how and why •••• tt He 
found in the speech the need to go on their-own road and to try to find 
a way of their own in order to avoid this peril. 
Finally, on June 30, 1956, a few weeks after the United States 
State Department's publication of the speech~ the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Union felt obliged to pass a resolution offering additional 
explanations of the cult. Again the answers were vague. More than 
half of the resolution was a tirade against the West for unjust 
exploitation of the s itua.tion. The sane reasons were given for the 
development of the cult: the threat of Western encirclement calling 
for unity of the Party, the need for rapid industrialization, and 
Stalin's great achievements. 73 Again the nfinn guarantees that such 
phenomena as the personality cult will never again develop •••• were 
that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union •••.• told the whole 
truth no matter how bitter.'' 74 Then the assurance came that though 
there were harmful aspects of the cult, the "correct path of development 
. 75 
toward Communismn was not hindered. After four months, the collective 
still was not able to develop a satisfactory answer. 
Tito found in the speech a chance for more independence from 
Moscow. Criticizing the bureaucratic apparatus from which the dictatorship 
stemmed, he accepted the Soviet leaders position that they were not at 
fault, that it had been forced upon them. In so doing, he assumed the 
• leadership for the independent line of Communist parties. 
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Comrades, that fight will be a hard and long one, for 
what is at stake is nothing less than whether the new 
line that began in Yugoslavia and which was in part 
adopted in the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of 
the C.P.S.U. shall triumph in Communist parties every-
where. The issue is whether this new line will win or 
whether the old Stalinist line will again get the upper 
hand.76 
The speech had opened a flood of criticism from the Communist 
parties. Other countries within the bloc found it difficult to keep 
the flood within its bounds. Labor lews had to be re1axed in 
. '17 
Czechslovakia and Rumania. It gave a strong impetus for independence 
of Communist parties from Moscow, led by Ti to and Togliatti •. 
Particularly after the intervention in Hungary, mass resignations occurred 
in the French and Italian parties; British, Swiss, Dutch and Danish. 
Communist leaders faced serious problems within the pe;ty. 78 
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Politically, the Soviet Union has altered since the death of 
Stalin. The personality of Khrushchev, who likes people and enjoys 
79 
talking and mixing with them, has created a freer political atmosphere. 
Of more importance in this development of a freer atmosphere is the 
subjugation of the secret police to Party control. No longer are there 
any mass secret arrests and executions for political reasons. The 
labor camps have been emptied and thousands of people rehabilitated 
posthumously. With a reorganization of the concentration camp system, 
two-thirds of the labor camps in Siberia were abolished, and today, (1957) 
of the total prison population, only two percent are political prisoners. 80 
The judicial system has been refonned though it is far from 
independent of the executive-legislative branch of the government.Bl 
Special tribunals used in the purges were abolished in April, 1956 and 
investigative procedures were placed under judicial authority. No 
longer can a person be condemned solely on his personal confession. The 
elastic terms of ''enemies of the people" and "counter revolutionary 
activity" are not written in the law and the concept of class war intensi-, 
fying as the march goes on toward socialism is rejected. However, there 
are still formulas used by the executive-legislative branch to justify 
arbitrary action such as, accusing a person or group of 'tconspiracy with 
the aim of seizing power.•t82 There is arbitral'"IJ use of punishment in 
the parasite law in which citizens can vote an "unproductive" member out 
•t 83 of their communi Y• In this law, any group of citizens can call a 
meeting to vote and the sentence of two to five years banishment can be 
t . 1 . i t 
84 
carried through wi h a simp e maJor ty vo e. 11 The laws passed. • • 
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represent a compromise between the desire to achieve a rule of law on 
the one hand and the interest of the party apparatus in preset~ing 
. th th " 85 its ascendency on e o er. 
In no law is the Party mentioned or its rights and powers defined, 
but according to official statements, the Party is the supreme directing 
force of the Soviet state. Legal guarantees of citizens are missing in 
the constitution. 86 Th~ power still lies in the Party apparatus of 
which Khrushchev has firm control. The apparatus has a different flavor 
from that of Stalin. There are debates within the Party and differences 
of opinion. A more educated group, people with university degrees, 
have begun to replace the old Party members. 87 The Party itself has 
become more sensitive to public opinion.88 This has been necessary 
with the lessened use of terror but has, at the same time, raised 
Khrushchev's degree of popularity and mobilized the energy and loyalty 
of the people behind him. 89 
The Party numbers have increased rapidly. Between 1952 and 1956 
the Party membership rose one-third of a million; between 1956 and 1959, 
it increased one million. Khr.ushchev has extended the Party administrative 
network into spheres, such as the collective farms, not formerly penetrated. 
The government is strict but the people are accustomed to harsh laws. 
They need, however, the security of a rational government, and this has 
been partially achieved under Khrushchev. Yet as the government becomes 
more rational, there is a loss of ideological fervor. This loss a....~d the 
consequent weakening of the Party is a problem with which the leaders 
90 have to contend. 
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Other problems h~ve develop'ed since the de-Stal inization speech of 
1956. It is hard to determine the politics of a group when there is 
one general spokesman, but it is evident .that major problems oocurred;;. 
Khrushchev was discredited in 195'/ after the re vol ts in Hungary and 
Poland broke out, and an "anti-Party group" rose up to oppose him. 91 
The rise of this oppos it:fon showed that Khrushchev still operated within 
the Party apparatus and the collective, rather than above it.92 He had 
not yet assumed the power which. Stalin possessed. The shifts and turns 
in .. the policy were not a measure· of his arbitrary power but a measure 
of the intensity of the political battle to sustain his authority. 93 
The leaders of the opposition group were Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich. 
A political .battle ensued, resulting in their expulsion by a Central 
Corn.mi ttee resolution in July. 94 Khrushchev was able to defeat this 
group with the help of Marshall Zhukov who linked the "anti-Party group" 
.... : 
with the purges of 1938. In a manner similar to Stalin, Khrushchev then 
turned on Zhukov, forcing his resignation in October of that same year.95 
He deviated from Stalin's methods by not killing his opponents. They 
were either exiled or relegated to a lower position of authority. 
During this period of political strife, Khrushchev made a partial 
retreat from his policy of de-Stalinization, claiming that "Stalinism 
nor Stalin himself could be separated from Communism.n96 He seemed to 
try to go back to Stalinism to maintain control when threatened. 'This 
enabled him to use more freely the methods of Stalin in crushing his 
opponents. Certainly, in Hungary, Khrushchev made a complete reversion 
'to'. s;tal fn' ism• The structu.re of his regime seems to be the same 
24 
but the style is different,- as reflected in the personalities of the 
two men. Khrushchev has retained full appointive and removal powers 
and, with the fall of Zhukov, unquestioned control over the military. 
U though disagreements occur, Khrushchev will not tolerate any persistent 
t f •t' t h' l' . 
97 pos ure o opposi ion o is po icies. 
With the major political opposition crushed, Khrushchev has ultimate 
authority. A·cult has been developing around him. This was particularly 
evident in the Twenty-first Party Congress when no mention was made~c; 
·of the collective. Khrushchev was gbr:}n special praise and thanked 
personally for solving the problems of the Soviet Union. 98 The sa~e 
thing occurred in the Twenty-second Party Congress. At this Congress, 
Khrushchev devoted a great deal of time to renewing his attack on the 
anti-Party group and on the cult of Stalin. Khrushchev attempted to 
improve his public image by contrasting the successful and the 
ostensibly benevolent aspects of his regime with conditions under 
Stalin. 
Khrushchev's bid for more power in the Twenty-second Congress we.s 
only partially successful. There are limits placed on Khrushchev 
today that Stalin did not have.· The awakening of the public to 
political matters sets up a limit. It is not yet a positive force, 
99 
but the potential is there and threatening. The Soviet public is 
much more educated now. This was necessary to achieve industrial 
success, but it makes manipulation of the people more difficult. 
Then, there exists in politics a point of no return in which pressure, 
building up as a result of limited· concessions, could force Khrushchev 
25 
to yield more than he expected. Khrushchev has not reached this point 
as is evidenced by his vacillating policy of liberalization, but even 
now, it would be practically impossible to return to strict Stal inism.
100 
This serves to make Khrushchev cautious. Khrushchev, himself, is a 
product of the machine and cannot violate its fundamental tenents. 
Through the machine he was able to achieve power and oniy through it 
can he maintain this power. Stalin created the machine and controlled 
it, Khrushchev inherited the machine, and has to contend with it. 
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Probably the most persistent pressure that Khrushchev has ~aced 
is from the intelligentsia and the rising number of educated people. 
He has avoided the use of terror to such an extent that its reintro-
duction would bring disaster. Consequently, he has to rely for the 
most part, on threats and Party pressure, a much weaker weapon. Thus, 
with the risks lessened, the Soviet intelligentsia have begun to stir. 
Imme"diately after Stalin's death, books were published anticipating 
a freer expression. This trend was sharply rebuked at the Second 
Writers Congress in 1954.lOl The .revolt of the literary conscience 
recurred after the Twentieth Party Congress.102 There was a rash of 
literature which contained veiled attacks on the Soviet regime. An 
i~portant book appearing in 1956 was Dudintsev's Not By Bread Alone. 
This is the story of an inventor who cannot get his invention produced 
due to the intrigue in the bureaucracy. The inventor is favorably 
contrasted with the objectionable Party man. The novel sympathetically 
depicts an individual who breaks away from the Party line and rises 
above it. It was not a literary work of any great magnitude, but it 
roused the Soviet people and a great deal of discussion. Khrushchev 
attacked Dudintsev as a ncaluminiator who took malicious joy in 
describing the negative sides of Soviet lifen and tagged the book as 
"unhealthy, tendentious, and obnoxious. " 103 He failed to explain why 
the book was so popular. Dudintsev did not recant and wrote in March, 
1957: 
Surely it should be possible to let go of us, as 
one does with beginners in the water, and to let us 
swim on our own. We wouldn't drown. But, alas, I 
am conscious all the time of the safety line, ••• 
and it prevents me from swimming.104 
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This safety line was the Party's attitude toward art, as disclosed in 
1957. In January of that year, the Party announced: 
We are no friends of freedom as a thing in itself. We 
are opposed to that kind of literary freedom which 
strikes at the fundamental principles of loyalty to a 
cause. The only freedom of thought we support is 
freedom wibhin the framework of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. 5 . 
Khrushchev has made clear how far that framework extended. The 
artist was to have the task of faithfully illustrating the Party line. 
After these attacks; several writers became silent ss a protest 
to this contro1.106 However, they were soon subdued and the novels 
have again become colorless with a few important exceptions. The book 
causing the most stir was Boris Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago which received 
the Nobel prize in 1958. It was not allov1ed to be published in Russia. 
The book showed Dr. Zhivago's complete disillusionment with the revolution 
and his inclination to consider human life more important than the 
revolution. The Party branded Pasternak as a traitor and would allow 
him to accept the prize only on threat of being exiled. 
A\nother such book is the Yugoslavian Djilas', The New Class. 
He, a Communist .. is dissatisfied with the existing "Communist" society 
and he recognized the development of a Party ~ite to replace the 
destroyed old one. He wrote: 
The heroic era of Communism is past. The epoch of 
its great leaders has ended. The epoch of practical 
men has set in. The new class has been created. It 
is at the height of its power and wealth, but it is 
without new ideas. It has nothing more to tell the 
people. The only thing that remains is for it to 
justify itself.107 
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He had lived under the Communist regime long enough to recognize 
the contradictions between f'act and theory. In actuality, the leaders 
of the revolution of 1917 were betrayed. They expected the state to 
whither eway but instead the reverse occurred. The new class was 
even worse than the previous one because it did not take root in the 
life of the nation; the class consciousness, its origins in a political 
party, developed before its political and economic power. Consequently, 
it made the structure to uphold itself.-~.;Tnis necessitated a strict 
unity of belief and an iron discipline. It drew into its ranks those 
desiring to gain materially and repressed those with ideals. It 
established a monopoly in the name of the working class which was a 
monopoly over it and the socialist ownership was a disguise for the 
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real ownership of the political bureaucracy. 
Djilas briefly traces the development of modern Communism from 
Marx, who did not prevent opposing ideas, to Stalin, who abolished 
all deviation of any kind. Khrushchev is the logical successor, an 
'•apparently sincere, kind-hearted, non-intellectual 'man of the people. ,nl09 
The new class is tired of purges and desires to live quietly. They 
are renouncing only the method and not the authori ty.llO He condemns 
the new class and sees no solution except its destruction. 
When the new class leaves the historical scene--and 
this must happen--there will be less sorrow over its 
passing than there was for any other class before it. 
Smothering everything except what suited its ego, i'h 
has condemned itself to failure and shameful ruin. 
These are men who lived, and were educated, under the Stalin 
regime, yet whose perception did not dull. It is these and men like 
them who Khrushchev cannot manipulate--a fo:rmidable barrier. 
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Malcolm Muggeridge. a correspondent to Russia wrote: "How remarkable 
that Pasternak should have outlived Stalin and still been able to feel! 
How ominous for the grisly band who have inherited the 'monstrous 
machine' to which the Revolution gave . ,.112 rise. Though he cannot 
manipulate them, he can still control them because he has the power over 
the press. 
The educated are slow to come to the support of these men daring 
to be individuals. The old have spent most of their adult life, and 
the young, their whole life, under the stifling influence of Stalin. 
They turned away from politics and devoted their interests to other 
fields. Only in the last ten years have they begun to look on the 
ideological framework as the limits, rather than the center, of their 
world, partly a result of the downgrading of Stalin.113 There is a 
desire for free expression which is not an objection to poli tica.l 
control, but to the pervasiveness of the controls. 114 This. is evidenced 
in the extreme popularity of recent poets. They attract huge crowds 
to listen to their poetry which is a form of free expression. One 
of the poets best knmvn to the Western wqrld, is Yevtushenko. His 
poem nThe Heirs of Stal in" showed a great deal of insight into the 
regime led by Khrushchev. He wrote: 
While the heirs of Stalin walk this eerth, 
Stalin, 115 I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum. 
These intelligentsia. are easy to subdue and keep· in line for the 
present, yet as more beg~n to think along political lines, this 
cannot long be the case. The lack of initiative on the part of the 
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intelligentsia is partly due to the educational, system;· The closer 
a subject gets to politics, the less objective i~ that subject taught. 116 
Therefore, the people do not have the education needed. "·This is seen 
particularly in the fields of law, philosophy, economy, and history. 
The Merxist principles are taught as a ritual in these fields which 
· hinders relevant education, whether it is believed or not.117 For 
the present there seems to be a. passive toleration of the Communist 
doctrine but how much ectual absorption by thinking people is 
questionable. The writers,discipline themselves to the Party line but 
at any relexation, speak out. This happened in 1954. Writers such as 
Yevtushenko reveal their skepticism of the existing government but 
still accept it fully. Khrushchev recognized this situation and in. 
1958 introduced a reform of the educational system. Emphasis was 
placed on technical training. Everyone attends eight y~ars of school. 
To get a. higher education one must work a certain a.mount of time in 
a factory. In the ideologically sensitive fields, the requirements are 
' ' 
greatet, calling for more work and higher entrance qU:alifications. 118 
History suffered with the frequent changes in Po.rty< line. In 
the secret speech, Khrushchev condemned Stalin's "Short Course" history 
in which Stalin was made to appear the creator and prote,ctor of the 
Soviet Union. Though Khrushchev called for a better history, he still 
looks at history in the same light as Stal in. To a French delegation 
,, 
in 1956, Khrushchev stated: "Historians a.re dangerous people. They 
are capable of upsetting everything. 
. 119 
They must be directed." 
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At present, there is e. difference in Party history, 'for two features 
have been added: "The liquidation of the hannful consequences of the 
cult of personality ••• [end) the recording-of the substantial beginnings 
of a. new cult(of Khrushche;j ."120 
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Has there been a change in Russia? Ifa_s there been a return to 
Marxist principles as proclaimed in the secret speech of 1956? Ten 
years have passed since Stalin's death and with these years many changes 
have been made. Most a re the normal changes which must occur if a 
society is to develop at all. There has to be greater artistic 
freedom if it does not become completely stagnated. A nation which 
produced such great literary figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries would have to be sensitive to this leek in the twentieth 
century. In saving itself, the collective destroyed the Secret Police 
and therefore had to alter the judicial system to fit 'the circumstances. 
There has been a change in type of control. An easier and more 
rational atmosphere exists today in Russia. This type of control is 
more efficient and easier to maintain than that of Stalin which 
demanded constant vigilance. The changes ste:mm~dfrom expediency and 
not from a sincere belief in reforin on the part of the collective 
and le_te r, Khrushchev. 
In its basic structure, the Soviet Union is no different than it 
was during Stalin's lifetime. It remains a totalitarian government 
with Khrushchev at the helm; he retains the same methods of control with 
the exception of the Secret Police; there is no freedom of speech 
al though the cont:r:-ol is exercised wi fu more moderation. Khrushchev 
has been able to defeat his political opposition and manipulate the 
Russian people. 
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The changes which have occurred could lead to !3. break-up of 
the totalitarian system but this is not likely. Some writers take an 
optimistic view. Djilas in ending his condemnation of the Communist 
system states: 
It ' '·"· ' 
In, any cese, the world will change e,nd will go on in. 
the direction in which it has been moving and must go on--toward 
121 greater unity, progress and freedom." However, changes, such es 
in the educational system, will keep flare-ups under control. Whether 
or not the changes will be of any great significance depends on a 
people who are well known for their ability to put up with harsh 
governments and who are slow to change. With a history of personal 
rulers, the majority of Russians "have a deep hankering efter a 
stern, remote father figure, standing high above the hurly-burly of 
d . l'f 11122 or inary i e. Crankshaw feels that Khrushchev has the qualities 
which go along with such a figure. 
After that experience (Pr seeing Khrushchev out of 
publi~ I found it never again possible to see the 
characteristic, ebullient, and noisey Khrushchev 
without being acutely conscious of the still centre 
?f Y°22 man who knew what he wanted and was getting 
l t. . 
Through Khrushchev's practical leadership, the people have had more of 
their material needs satisfied. They are no longer afraid and conse-
quently live in an atmosphere of apparent freedom. The shared desire 
of the Party emd the. people to raise the standards of living has 
relaxed tensions. 
During the decade of the 1960's we shall, under present 
prospects, be dealing with a Soviet system that is growing 
rapidly in economic, scientiflic and military strength end 
which 'will have fewer rather than more difficulties in 
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preserving political stability and an adequate measure of 
ideological uniformity. These growing strengths, not offset 
by equivalent new weaknesses, will enable its leaders to 
devote greater rather than smaller resources and political 
detennine.tion to achieving the worldwide purposes that have 
been proclaimed in an evolving pattern ~f4interpretation by Lenin and Stalin and new by Khrushchev. 
Most important is that Khrushchev, himself, admits no basic change in 
the system and he is the designer for the new structure built on 
the old foundation of Stal inism. In 1961 he stated: "The cult of 
personality was a superficial boil on the perfectly healthy organism 
rt 11 125 H M of our pa Y• is speech given on 1arch 8, 1963, reaffirmed 
this basic policy: 
Having eradicated the consequences of the personality cult of 
Stalin, the Communist Party has removed all obstacles to the 
initiative and activity of the working masses, and has created 
the best possible conditions for the development of the 
creative forces of the people •••• A new period in the life 
of the Pa.rty and the people has arrived •••• But this does 
not mean that now, after the condemnation of the personality 
cult, the time has come for laissez-faire, that the reins of 
government have supposedly been loosened, that the public ship 
is sailing according to the will of the waves, and that 
everyone can act on his aim as he pleases. No. The party·. 
has been following and will continue to follow, consistently 
and firmly, the Leninist course that it has fashioned, 
Implacably rejecting any ideological vacillation and attempts 
to violate the norms of life of our society.126 
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